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SUBJECT: HH-1

1. HH-1's personal background is that of a peasant boy who's father got rich and had him go to the university. Direct intelligence background of HH-1 appears to be weak. Subject has not undergone any proper intelligence training. He is the type of a provincial busybody with peasant-slyness that sometimes reaches shrewdness. Governed by these characteristics he approaches any problem; however, he lacks a methodical mind and always changes subjects without having the previous one completed.

2. His original contact with intelligence appears to have occurred between 1934 and 1945 when he was the illegal editor of the Nazi "Oesterreichischer Beobachter", there he collected and digested intelligence on a subjective party-line basis. His work as a leading man with the Upper Austrian Gauleitung was ruled by subjectivity, as it was customary within NSDAP. His brief (3-months) work with the German Foreign Office, a study trip through the Balkans, ended with his being fired for allegedly exaggerated subjectivity directed against RIBBENTROP's pet-diplomats. As a soldier he was again in press-work with the Propaganda-Kompanie. Still officially with that organization, he wound up in the Adriatic coast area as an adviser to Gauleiter and Reichskommissar RAINER at Trieste. There subject had built up a contact with Catholic Bishop Antonio SANTIN to save the Trieste harbor from destruction by the Germans.

3. When on an alleged mission for SANTIN to the Pope, he was recognized by Austrian refugees in Rome who had him arrested by the British. Subject from 1945 through 1947 was kept under British internment and was then handed over to the Austrians who finally released him from prison in 1948. This imprisonment had left its marks on HH-1 and has possibly made him somewhat numb for the threat of arrest, provided this would not harm his imagined reputation. He is likely to think of himself in terms of a martyr on behalf of Greater-German interests.

4. In 1948, HH-1 joined up through Erich KERNMAYR with Dr. Wilhelm HOTTEL. His work with that "intelligence-selling" group consisted of interpreting and translating, as he explained it. The group, in its majority, consisted of

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- 2 -

old Nazi hands. As subject explains it, the split occurred soon after. From then on he reported unfriendly on HOTTLE and later on also on KERNMAYR. It is not impossible that subject's animosity was based subjectively on an aversion against HOTTLE's more conservative trend, and when feeling a competition with KERNMAYR's socialist connections also against the latter. He and KERNMAYR were using the same socialists for their hoped-for success in an easy incorporation of large numbers of former Nazis within SPOs. Either one had hoped for a personal success as "the" leading appenser, neither of them made achievements on a large scale. There is one fundamental idea that H-M-1 KERNMAYR and HOTTLE have in common: They hope to use intelligence connections in an endeavor for a political career (they all have gone through the same schooling of Nazi subjectivity).

215